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NOBODY'S PERFECT
Stephan Landsman*
We owe Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey Rachlinski, and Andrew Wistrich our grati-
tude. They have singly, and as a team, expanded our knowledge of the work-
ings of judges' minds.' They have shown us that judges are subject to
hindsight bias,2 can be manipulated by anchoring,3 will sometimes fall prey to
the lure of inappropriate evidence4 and suffer a number of other "blinders." 5
They have, in a sustained, thoughtful, and thorough way moved us well beyond
the anecdotal. They are not the first to use social science methods to try to
understand judicial behavior. They were preceded by Harry Kalven and Hans
Zeisel who, despite the fact that they concentrated most of their attention on
jurors in their great work THE AMERICAN JURY, tried to puzzle out why judges
so much more frequently than jurors vote to convict criminal defendants in
cases where judge and jury disagree on a verdict.6 Guthrie and colleagues have
introduced rigor where those who came before them proceeded in a desultory
fashion.7 Chris Guthrie now seeks to use the newfound insights about the judi-
cial psyche to fashion a broader argument about the merits (or demerits) of the
American justice system, at least in its classical adversarial form.
In this short piece I will suggest that Professor Guthrie's work is part of a
historical trend that has increasingly focused on judicial fallibility. Having
documented judges' flaws, Professor Guthrie champions what he considers a
better solution, one he finds within the world of alternative dispute resolution
("ADR"). I will argue that this assessment fails to take into consideration
* Robert A. Clifford Professor of Tort Law and Social Policy, DePaul University College of
Law.I See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 777 (2001) [here-
inafter Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind]; Chris Guthrie et al., Judging by Heuristic:
Cognitive Illusions in Judicial Decision Making, 86 JUDICATURE 44 (2002); Kim A. Kamin
& Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post # Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Pater-
nalism, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1165 (2003); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the
Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation, 79 OR. L. REv. 61 (2000); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Posi-
tive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 571 (1998); Andrew
J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliber-
ately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1251 (2005).
2 See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 1, at 802-03.
3 Id. at 791-92.
4 See Wistrich et al., supra note 1.
5 Chris Guthrie, Misjudging, 7 NEV. L. J. 420, 420-427 (2007).
6 HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 121-90 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 1971) (1966) [hereinafter Kalven & Zeisel].
7 See, e.g., Stephan Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry Into the Effect of
Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Jurors in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. &
L. 113 (1994). As the title suggests this was but a preliminary look at one sort of judicial
behavior. Little other material was generated before Guthrie et al. came on the scene.
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either the precautions taken in the judicial process to address judges' shortcom-
ings or the weaknesses in the ADR approach.
I think before considering Professor Guthrie's arguments it might be use-
ful to place his important psychological work in a broader intellectual and polit-
ical context. When Kalven and Zeisel started their exploration of the collective
mind of American jurors in the late 1950s, they began by assuming that the
decisions of judges were the yardstick or standard by which juror performance
was to be measured.8 Judges were assumed, at least generally, to be the deci-
sion makers likely to get things "right."9 This assumption appeared to reflect a
general social consensus that judges were wise and reliable decision makers. In
light of then current complaints,' the question confronting Kalven and Zeisel
was whether the jury could measure up or whether it should give way to more
professional factfinders.
So high was American confidence in judicial competence that throughout
the 1960s, 1970s, and into the 1980s, ever more procedural and substantive
power was ceded to the judiciary, especially in the federal courts." Judges
were transformed from "umpires" who oversaw the courtroom contest and
interpreted the law to "managers" who were afforded control over every step in
the litigation process.' 2 They were given enhanced authority to cut off trial
through summary judgment,' 3 to shape and control the direction of the litiga-
8 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, at 10 ("[W]e study the performance of the jury
measured against the performance of the judge as a baseline.").
I Id. at 86 ("The judge presumably does not draw the jury's distinction between adult and
child victims in [certain] cases because the formal law does not draw it, and he is bound by
tradition and role to stay within the sentiments of the formal law.").
10 Id. at 5-6 (detailing critics' charges against the jury).
" Judith Resnik argued in 1997 that:
[Tihe history of these past decades is one of growing judicial discretion over civil process, of
judicial care to guard its own discretionary authority, of ongoing variation between national and
local rules and between rules and practice, and of declining discussion by trial judges of their
roles as adjudicators. Thus far, the judiciary has generally succeeded in convincing Congress
that expansive judicial discretion over civil case processing is appropriate.
Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and Congressional Rulemak-
ing on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 ALA. L. REV. 133, 136 (1997). On
the issue of substantive judicial power, see Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism:
Restriking the Balance Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REv.
1753, 1810 (2004). In 1994, one scholar referred to federal judges as "the proverbial 800-
pound gorilla." Thomas E. Baker, The Inherent Power to Impose Sanctions: How a Federal
Judge is Like an 800-Pound Gorilla, 14 REv. LITIG. 195, 197 (1994).
12 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374, 425 (1982).
13 In 1986, the Supreme Court decided a trilogy of cases on summary judgment: Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242. The Court emphasized the value of
using summary judgment for screening weak cases before trial. Robert Gregory argues that:
The Supreme Court's decisions on summary judgment corresponded with broader concerns
about the ability of courts to manage an increasingly burdensome caseload. The 1983 amend-
ments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure facilitated changes in the summary judgment
procedure by granting district courts unprecedented case management powers. Even before the
Supreme Court trilogy, there were signs that lower courts were moving toward a more expansive
use of the summary judgment procedure. Some courts and commentators "thought the time
[was] ripe for recognizing the potential of summary judgments to deal with increasingly crowded
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tion through pretrial conferences, 4 and to overturn jury judgments both at the
trial 5 and appellate level. 16 The imperial judiciary came into flower17 and
with it a sort of judicial visibility and responsibility not experienced before.
At the same time that judicial power was expanding, social scientists were
beginning to assemble a dossier on the judges' constitutionally mandated part-
ner - the jury. The research disclosed a body that had both great strengths and
serious weaknesses. Kalven and Zeisel found that juries generally got criminal
cases right18 and handled complexity remarkably well.' 9 Later researchers
would refine the portrait but generally agreed with these conclusions.2 ° Yet the
jurors were never viewed as a match for the judges who, it was assumed, pos-
sessed superior wisdom and acumen. Jurors, it was discovered, were likely to
stumble over statistics,2 ' to be lured astray by certain categories of irrelevant or
misleading evidence22 and to be vulnerable to a number of "blinders" like hind-
sight bias23 and anchoring.24 Since judges were not being studied, there were
dockets and rising litigation costs." The trilogy solidified this trend and paved the way for the
"modem era" of summary judgment practice.
Robert J. Gregory, One Too Many Rivers to Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modern Era of
Summary Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689, 691 (1996).
14 In 1983, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 16 was expanded to give judges more
power for pretrial management. See Charles R. Richey, Rule 16 Revisited: Reflections for
the Benefit of Bench and Bar, 139 F.R.D. 525, 526 (1992) ("Rule 16 contains enormous
potential as a device for developing creative case management strategies. I believe that Rule
16 is the most important rule of civil procedure for a trial judge, because, along with our
inherent power, it is the specific repository of the authority of a federal trial judge to manage
the judicial calendar."). Robert B. McKay points out that "Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to
make specific what had probably been intended from the beginning - that the trial judge was
indeed the ruler, not only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire pretrial process." Rob-
ert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 818,
823 (1988).
15 See Stephan Landsman, Appellate Courts and Civil Juries, 70 U. CIN. L. REv. 873, 893-
900 (2002).
16 Id.
17 Michael A. Rebell and Robert L. Hughes indicate that:
Beginning in 1954 with the U.S. Supreme Court's landmark school desegregation decision,
Brown v. Board of Education, the federal courts have become increasingly involved in remedial
oversight of basic functions of state and local governments. This unprecedented judicial reme-
dial involvement accelerated in the 1960s and 1970s as numerous judicial decrees implemented
the desegregation mandate, and others called for reform of such institutions as state mental
health facilities, prison systems, and housing projects. This new judicial role was vigorously
attacked in some quarters as unwarranted "judicial activism" which was said to reflect the arro-
gance of "an imperial judiciary" and to violate established canons of the separation of powers.
Michael A. Rebell & Robert L. Hughes, Efficacy and Engagement: The Remedies Problem
Posed by Sheff v. O'Neill - and a Proposed Solution, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1115, 1120 (1997).
18 See KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 6, passim.
19 Id. at 149-62.
20 See VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 97-148 (1986).
21 See Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 49 (1996); William C. Thompson, Are Juries Competent to Evaluate Statistical Evi-
dence?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1989).
22 See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 7.
23 See Jonathan D. Casper et al., Juror Decision Making, Attitudes, and the Hindsight Bias,
13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 291, 308-09 (1989) (noting that jurors generally have difficulty
disregarding ultimate outcomes even when instructed to do so).
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no data suggesting that they experienced similar difficulties. Matching experi-
mentally scrutinized jurors with idealized judges led jury critics to argue for the
curtailing of juror authority especially in "complex" cases. Although the
Supreme Court flirted with such a step, it did not embrace it,2 5 declining to
follow up on the suggestion advanced in Ross v. Bernard to create a complexity
exception to the Seventh Amendment right to jury trial.26
Gibbon suggested that it is the fate of all empires to decline and fall.2 7
And such has been the fate of the judicial empire. By the 1990s, attacks on
judicial "activism" and discretion became widespread and particularly popular
among politicians. 2 ' By the turn of the millennium the judiciary was under
significant pressure. 2 1 Its traditional virtually unfettered power over criminal
24 See Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask for, the More You
Get: Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 526,
531 (1996); John Malouff & Nicola S. Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Request-
ing Different Damages Amounts in Personal Injury Trials, 129 J. Soc. PSYCHOL. 491, 494
(1989).
25 Steven I. Friedland points out that jury failures in complex and lengthy civil litigation and
in other contexts, such as understanding jury instructions, have created doubts about the
efficacy of the jury as a competent decisionmaking body. Steven I. Friedland, Legal Institu-
tions: The Competency and Responsibility of Jurors in Deciding Cases, 85 Nw. U. L. REV.
190, 191 (1990).
26 See, e.g., Michelle L. Hartmann, Is It a Short Trip Back to Manor Farm? A Study of
Judicial Attitudes and Behaviors Concerning the Civil Jury System, 54 SMU L. REV. 1827,
1852 (2001) ("In a footnote in Ross v. Bernard, [396 U.S. 531, 538 n.10 (1970)], the
Supreme Court indicated that 'the practical abilities and limitations of juries' may affect the
right to a trial by jury in civil cases. The Court declined to answer whether this language
supported a Seventh Amendment exception to the right to a jury trial in complex civil
cases.").
27 EDWARD GIBBON, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (Random House 2003)
(1776).
28 William Wayne Justice, The Two Faces of Judicial Activism, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 1
(1992) ("'Judicial activism' is, more often than not, a code word used to induce public
disapproval of a court action that a politician opposes, but is powerless to overturn."). Kee-
nan D. Kmiec found that "[d]uring the 1990s, the terms 'judicial activism' and 'judicial
activist' appeared in an astounding 3,815 journal and law review articles." Keenan D.
Kmiec, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial Activism", 92 CAL. L. REV. 1441,
1442 (2004).
29 Congress has enacted a number of pieces of legislation to curb judiciary power. The
Civil Justice Reform Act and Sentencing Reform Act are prominent examples. Linda S.
Mullenix argues that the Civil Justice Reform Act:
has effected a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal
judicial branch to the legislative branch. Congress has taken procedural rulemaking power away
from judges and their expert advisors and delegated it to local lawyers. By the expedient of
declaring procedural rules to be substantive law, Congress has effectively repealed the Rules
Enabling Act. Congress has by fiat stripped the judicial branch of a power that uniquely bears on
the judicial function: the power to prescribe internal rules of procedure for the federal courts.
By legislative stealth in enacting the Civil Justice Reform Act, Congress is continuing to trans-
form the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules into a quaint, third-branch vestigial organ.
Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375,
379 (1992).
Lewis J. Liman argues that:
The Sentencing Reform Act violates the separation of powers in two ways. Locating the power
to determine sentences in an administrative agency violates the nondelegation doctrine. At the
same time, the requirement that three [A]rticle III judges sit on the Sentencing Commission, with
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sentencing was challenged and then curtailed.3" In the federal system a
mechanical set of euphemistically entitled "guidelines"3 were established that
ended much of the judges' flexibility and discretion in sentencing. The chal-
lenge to the judiciary did not end there. Across a broad spectrum, judicial
independence came under attack.32
No single case better embodies this challenge than that of Terri Schiavo.3 3
Congress saw fit to try to interfere with the operation of the Florida state courts
the possibility that the President might appoint - and discharge - up to six judges, compromises
judicial independence and impartiality.
Lewis J. Liman, The Constitutional Infirmities of the United States Sentencing Commission,
96 YALE L.J. 1363, 1369 (1987). Richard B. Hoffman and William M. Lucianovic indicate
that in the early 1980s "the goal of criticism from the other branches, and in particular from
Congress, was to reduce federal court jurisdiction. One congressional commentator
described the federal courts as 'under siege."' Richard B. Hoffman & William M. Lucia-
novic, Long Range Planning: A Reality in the Judicial Branch, 44 AM. U.L. REv. 1599,
1603 n.14 (1995) (quoting Charles C. Mathias, Jr., The Federal Courts Under Siege, 462
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 26, 26 (1982)).
30 Congress established new federal sentencing policy through the Sentencing Reform Act
of 1984, 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (2006). According to Andrew G. Deiss, "[t]he Federal Sen-
tencing Guidelines . . . represent the culmination of a reform movement aimed primarily at
curbing judicial discretion in sentencing." Andrew G. Deiss, Making the Crime Fit the Pun-
ishment: Pre-Arrest Sentence Manipulation by Investigators Under the Sentencing Guide-
lines, 1994 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 419, 419 (1994). For a comprehensive history of the
Sentencing Guidelines, see Thomas N. Whiteside, The Reality of Federal Sentencing:
Beyond the Criticism, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1574 (1997).
31 Daniel J. Freed describes the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual as:
a code of changing regulations that substantially constrain the wide ranges within which judges
formerly exercised discretion. It prescribes a starting point for each case, rules for determining
criminal history and for adjusting sentences upward and downward, tight ranges for each sen-
tence unless the judge finds a basis for departure, and a sequence for carrying out these steps.
Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits on the
Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1697 (1992).
32 Stephan 0. Kline points out:
[U]ltraconservatives in the 104th and 105th Congress have launched a particularly broad array of
attacks that pose a threat to judicial independence. The Republican majorities considered consti-
tutional amendments that would eliminate life tenure for federal judges. They passed bills which
limit the jurisdiction of courts and considered other legislation which would strip judicial reme-
dies. They convened hearings to study and control "judicial activism." The Senate has brought
gridlock to the judicial confirmation process, and senior Republicans have even articulated their
desire to impeach and "intimidate" judges because of distaste for particular judicial decisions.
Stephan 0. Kline, Judicial Independence: Rebuffing Congressional Attacks on the Third
Branch, 87 Ky. L.J. 679, 679 (1999). Paul L. Friedman argues that "[i]n the current climate,
maintaining and preserving . . . independence has become increasingly difficult even for
federal judges who have been appointed for life." Paul L. Friedman, Taking the High Road:
Civility, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 187,
199 (2001).
33 Terri Schiavo had been in a persistent vegetative state for more than ten years. Her
husband, Michael Schiavo, wanted her feeding tube removed, and claimed it was what Terry
wanted.
Her parents ha[d] steadfastly opposed.any such action. It [took] over six years for the courts to
resolve this end of life decision-making dispute, but within six days of the removal of the feeding
tube ... Governor [Jeb] Bush signed into law a bill that allowed him to order the feeding tube
reinserted ....
Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making, 9 HARv. NEGOT.
L. REv. 253, 254 (2004).
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and then, shamelessly, turned on the federal judiciary when it would not do
Congress's bidding.34 The politicians only abandoned their reprehensible
machinations when a disgusted public began to voice its anger at the legislators
who had chosen to use a family tragedy for partisan posturing.35
As these events were unfolding, some social scientists began to explore
new topics with respect to the delivery of justice. A number focused empirical
attention on the judges who had previously been assumed to set the gold stan-
dard. To no one's great surprise 3 6 experimental data indicated that judges are
human.37 They, like jurors, were found to suffer from hindsight bias and the
effects of anchoring. Comparisons between judges and jurors were trans-
formed. Now flawed human beings were featured on both sides of the equa-
tion. Not surprisingly, judges looked a whole lot like jurors.38 This is not to
say that no differences were identified. In some ways judges, as a group, per-
formed more effectively. 39 Be that as it may, the research demonstrated that
judges, like jurors, are prone to a range of psychological weaknesses in evaluat-
ing the cases before them.
A number of scholars, disappointed with the judiciary, the jury, and the
rest of the adversarial apparatus, set out to find a new group of heroes who
could wisely, impartially, and compassionately resolve disputes. These schol-
ars claimed that they had found their champions in the ranks of the arbitrators
and mediators who operated alternate dispute resolution ("ADR") mecha-
nisms.40 As with the claims made on behalf of judges in the '60s and '70s, the
4 Ross Silverman suggests that:
Congress engaged in a number of actions raising.., ethical and legal concerns. The U.S. House
of Representatives Committee on Government Reform ... issued subpoenas ordering Ms. Schi-
avo and her husband, as well as the nutrition and hydration-related equipment and several physi-
cians, to appear at a hearing before the committee. This same committee.., submitted petitions
to the Florida Supreme Court and the U.S. Supreme Court seeking relief on Ms. Schiavo's
behalf. Over Palm Sunday weekend, Congress passed and the President signed Public Law No.
109-003, "A bill to provide for the relief of the parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo," which raised
numerous Constitutional and policy questions ....
Symposium, Foreword: The Mass Media's Influence on Health Law and Policy, 5 Hous. J.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 175, 175-76 (2005).
15 George J. Annas noted that:
Overwhelming majorities of Americans in every major poll taken after Congress passed the
Theresa Schiavo Act found that Americans d[id] not want Congress involved in life-and-death
medical decisions, but believe[d] these should be made by families .... Moreover, the public
agreed with the determination of the courts in the Schiavo case itself.
George J. Annas "I Want to Live": Medicine Betrayed by Ideology in the Political Debate
Over Terri Schiavo, 35 STETSON L. REV. 49, 78 (2005).
36 See Landsman & Rakos, supra note 7.
37 Guthrie et al. made this point in 2001. Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note
1, at 784.
38 For a direct comparison making this point, see Landsman & Rakos, supra note 7.
3 Chris Guthrie and his colleagues concluded that judges "were much more attentive than
other experts to base-rate statistics" and were better able to "consider a case from multiple
frames." Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, supra note 1, at 818, 822.
40 See, e.g., Kevin R. Casey, Alternate Dispute Resolution and Patent Law, 3 FED. CIR. B.J.
1, 5 (1993) (arbitrators are superior because they may be selected for their particular exper-
tise); Frank A. Cona, Application of Online Systems in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 45
BuFF. L. REv. 975, 985 (1997) (same); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the "Haves" Come Out
Ahead in Alternative Judicial Systems? Repeat Players in ADR, 15 Omo ST. J. ON Disp.
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assertions of extraordinary skill made on behalf of ADR adepts were mostly
based on idealizations rather than research. Over the course of the last decade
some of these idealizations have been challenged. Arbitrators are today often
viewed as flawed adjudicators, prone to a number of weaknesses including
bias, inefficiency, and greed.4 ' Even mediators who, at least in theory, are not
imposing decisions but simply assisting disputants to find their own solutions
have come in for criticism.42 Most particularly that form of mediation referred
to as "evaluative," because the mediator supplies his or her own opinion about
an appropriate outcome, has increasingly been criticized as potentially coercive
and dependent on mediator attitudes that may be biased in favor of one dispu-
tant or another.4 3 Since the fall of the arbitrators and evaluative mediators, a
new ADR hero has been proclaimed, the "facilitative" mediator who, at least in
theory, relies only on the parties' own views in constructing a solution. 4 That
"facilitative" mediators only listen and help is an article of faith rather than a
matter of social science evidence, leading one to suspect that upon closer exam-
ination they, too, will be found to have feet of clay.
This brief and over-simplified history suggests that decision maker hagi-
ography is generally the product of idealization rather than close scrutiny or
psychological examination. Such was the case when judges were lionized and
RESOL. 19, 59 (1999) ("[T]he repeat player mediator or arbitrator who is expert in a particu-
lar field (like discrimination law) actually may provide not only 'better' quality resolutions,
but more efficient and claimant sensitive services.").
41 See Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (2005)
[hereinafter Compulsion].
42 Ellen A. Waldman indicates that "many mediators employ a 'trashing' style, dissecting
the flaws and weak points in each disputant's case according to prevailing legal norms."
Ellen A. Waldman, Identifying the Role of Social Norms in Mediation: A Multiple Model
Approach, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 734 (1997) (citing James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and
Hashing it Out: Is this the End of "Good Mediation"?, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 66-68
(1991))
43 Lela P. Love argues that "an 'evaluative' mediator gives advice, makes assessments,
states opinions - including opinions on the likely court outcome, proposes a fair or workable
resolution to an issue or the dispute, or presses the parties to accept a particular resolution."
Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 937, 938 (1997) (arguing that these "activities are inconsistent with the role of a
mediator.").
I According to Professor Leonard L. Riskin, a "facilitative mediator assumes that his prin-
cipal mission is to clarify and to enhance communication between the parties in order to help
them decide what to do." Leonard L. Riskin, Understanding Mediators' Orientations, Strat-
egies and Techniques: A Grid for the Perplexed, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7, 24 (1996).
Samuel J. Imperati stresses that:
The facilitative model of mediation is premised on the assumption that the mediator is totally
neutral and does not present personal views on the merits of the case. in other words, a facilita-
tive mediator is theoretically the least interventionist and, at most, would offer an option for
settlement only after it becomes clear that the parties cannot generate one on their own. For a
facilitative mediator, a "good" settlement is one that the parties can accept, even if one side
should or could achieve a better result in a courtroom. Such a mediator is not apt to remedy a
substantive power imbalance between the parties by giving the weaker party helpful factual or
legal information. However, a facilitative mediator will ensure that both parties have a full
opportunity to be heard on all issues.
Samuel J. Imperati, Mediator Practice Models: The Intersection of Ethics and Stylistic
Practices in Mediation, 33 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 703, 709-10 (1997).
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jurors criticized. It happened again with ADR providers whose virtues were
extolled while judges were damned on the basis of their all too human traits.
The pattern seems to be repeating itself in the comparisons being made between
evaluative and facilitative mediators. I think that there is good reason to doubt
that any group of decision makers or facilitators is free of those biases and
mental stumbling blocks that seem to characterize the human condition.
Despite Professor Guthrie's claim that judges' limitations are "largely
unacknowledged by the legal system,"45 judicial fallibility is not a new discov-
ery. Blackstone was concerned with the issue two-and-one-half centuries ago
when he declared:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our persons and our
properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that be entirely entrusted to the
magistracy, a select body of men, and those generally selected by the prince or such
as enjoy the highest offices in the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural
integrity, will have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank
and dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature that the few should be always
attentive to the interests and good of the many.46
If it is the case that every dispute resolution mechanism is flawed by the
all too human mental weaknesses of those who run it, what is to be done?
British lawyers and their progeny, the drafters of the American Constitution,
concluded that the only answer was a system of checks and balances that
allowed no participant in the process unfettered power. The check to the judges
in the Anglo-American system is the jury of twelve citizens called from their
daily lives and charged to do justice on a one-time basis. These citizen jurors
are free of the judge's biases. They bring the common sense of the community
into the courtroom and thereby insulate the process from the judicial predispo-
sitions that Blackstone described. Of course, jurors, too, are human, but their
numerosity generally serves to counterbalance the strong opinions of any one
juror.4 7 When the jury mechanism fails, the courts, both trial and appellate, are
available to review the decision and set things right. This is neither a speedy
nor inexpensive solution. It can be defeated by widely-shared prejudices and
corrupted in a number of other ways but has proven remarkably serviceable in
fostering the slow but palpable expansion of the rule of law.48
It is remarkable that in thinking about courts and in advising disputants
that the courthouse may not be "the best place to resolve their disputes, 4 9
Chris Guthrie makes virtually no mention of the jury. The jury was teamed
with judges because, long before the rise of social science, citizens understood
that judges are subject to biases and to the sorts of mental shortcomings exper-
ienced by all human beings. The balance struck in the Constitution bespeaks an
45 Guthrie, supra note 5, at 447.
46 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *379.
47 See Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 622, 706 (2001); Phoebe C. Ellsworth,
Are Twelve Heads Better than One?, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 205 (1989).
48 See E. P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 258-69
(1975).
49 Guthrie, supra note 5, at 460.
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awareness of the problem and a thoughtful effort to address it.50 To consider
judges alone when evaluating the worth of American courts is to miss the cru-
cial check that the system provides. If it is argued that jury trials are rare,5' the
answer may be that we should encourage their growth rather than abandon the
courts and chase after new and unproven solutions. If the concern is voiced
that jury trials are too costly, then we should explore ways to make them more
affordable.52 If it is argued that jurors are intellectually ill-equipped for the
job, then those making the charge have failed to read the myriad studies that
suggest otherwise.5 3 This is not to say that juries are the solution to all our
problems. There are a variety of disputes better settled through ADR. But as
lawyers and laymen have known for centuries, not all cases can or should be
settled without trial.54
In a range of situations, a binding determination by an outsider is neces-
sary both to the litigants and society. When those cases arise, as they do with
unceasing regularity, American tradition, history, and experience indicate that
judges working with juries are likely to arrive at the most socially satisfactory
solutions. Moreover, settling disputes in this way - in open court, with con-
tending parties offering their best proof under the watchful eye of a judge
sworn to uphold both substantive and procedural law - is likely to lend legiti-
macy not only to the decision made but to the whole adjudicatory process.5 5
Social science informs us that these effects touch litigants and onlookers
alike.56
Professor Guthrie does not agree. He has opted for the idealized ADR
provider as hero. Unfortunately, he has not exposed his hero to the same level
of scrutiny that he has applied to judges. Even without experimental data there
are a series of considerations that should give one pause before endorsing the
general superiority of ADR and its practitioners. First, ADR processes are, for
the most part, secret. 57 They are not open to public observation. While secret
proceedings may have their value, our society generally adheres to the view
that open and public processes lend integrity to the institutions that rely on
them.58 This is so because public disclosure is likely to serve as a check on
misconduct and to place pressure on all the participants (litigants and decision
50 Chris Guthrie and his colleagues have noted the superiority of jury trial, at least in some
contexts. See Wistrich et al., supra note 1, at 1259.
5' On the paucity of jury trials, see Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of
Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459
app. at 532 (2004).
52 Id. at 477-81.
51 See, e.g., Devine et al., supra note 47.
54 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619 (1995).
55 See Stephan Landsman, So What? Possible Implications of the Vanishing Trial Phenom-
enon, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 973, 978 (2004).
56 See generally E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDU-
RAL JUSTICE (1988).
5 See Compulsion, supra note 41, at 1628-29.
58 See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST
PRINCIPLES 119 (1997). ("[T]he public trial was designed to infuse public knowledge into the
trial itself, and, in turn, to satisfy the public that truth had prevailed at trial.").
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makers alike) to behave fairly.59 Closed processes are inferior in terms of lend-
ing legitimacy to the bodies that rely on them. If the history of recent events,
from Guantanamo6" to governmental consultations on national energy policy,6 '
teaches us anything it is that secrecy poses grave risks and often indicates
actors with something to hide.
The problem of secrecy is compounded in the ADR setting by the absence
of appellate review.6 2 Professor Guthrie criticizes the courts because of the
weakness of appellate review in catching judicial errors.63 That criticism loses
its force if the favored alternative (ADR) offers no review whatsoever. Again,
recent events counsel us that the absence of appellate oversight can lead both to
grave injustices and the appearances of an unjust system. Scholarly condemna-
tion of the hermetically sealed processes under consideration by the American
military to review enemy combatant status powerfully illustrates this point.6 4
Professor Guthrie contends that one of the more serious shortcomings of
the courts is that:
Because disputants in litigation settle in the shadow of legal rulings, agreements
reached while immersed in the litigation process might very well reflect the poten-
tially distorted judgment of the judge rather than the underlying merits of the case. 65
Putting aside all the qualifiers that render this statement hard to pin down,
it seems to be asserting that interim judicial rulings are, because of the judge's
mental infirmities, likely to drive litigants away from the "merits" as they seek
to settle their cases. This is not only a claim that cries out for empirical verifi-
cation but is as much a justification for getting judges back on the bench trying
" JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1834 (3d ed. 1976) ("In acting under the public gaze, [the
officers of the court] are more strongly moved to a strict conscientiousness in the perform-
ance of duty."); see also In re Continental Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir.
1984) ("[The public has a right to] monitor the functioning of [the] courts, thereby insuring
quality, honesty, and respect for [the] legal system.").
I In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2773 (2006), the Supreme Court rejected the
Bush Administration's secretive and unreviewable military tribunals, joining the world in the
condemnation of the Guantanamo approach. For criticisms from Danish, Swedish, and
Saudi Arabian officials, see Suzanne Goldenberg et al., Guantanamo Suicides: 'Killing
Themselves Was Unnecessary. But It Certainly Is a Good PR Move': Bush Officials' Hard
Line Provokes Condemnation: US Ally Admits Prison Is Hampering War on Terror, THE
GUARDIAN (London), June 12, 2006, at 3.
61 For a detailed description of the litigation surrounding the Bush Administration's refusal
to divulge records of those who had been in contact with the National Energy Policy Devel-
opment Group (allegedly including Enron's Kenneth Lay, among others), see Bradley Pack,
FOIA Frustration: Access to Government Records Under the Bush Administration, 46 ARIZ.
L. REV. 815, 837-38 (2004).
62 ADR lacks judicial procedural protections and sharply curtails appellate review. The
process is confidential, outside of public or judicial scrutiny, and lacks enforcement mecha-
nisms to address participant misconduct or abuse of the process. See Maureen A. Weston,
Checks on Participant Conduct in Compulsory ADR: Reconciling the Tension in the Need
for Good-Faith Participation, Autonomy, and Confidentiality, 76 IND. L.J. 591, 603-04
(2001).
63 Guthrie, supra note 5, at 447-48.
TM See GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDI-
TION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 552 (2004).
65 Guthrie, supra note 5, at 452.
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cases (rather than "managing" them with a flurry of pretrial rulings) as it is a
reason for shunning the court system.
At a deeper level, Guthrie's claim raises difficult questions about defining
what we mean by the "merits" of a case. In most branches of ADR, substantive
law is not formally applied.6 6 Hence, the "merits" are what ADR providers,
most particularly arbitrators, define them to be. This does not get us to the
parties' opinion of the "merits." Rather, it gets us to the arbitrators' subjective
understandings. No matter how badly a judge is doing her job, there are still
objective legal standards that may be brought to bear. No such standards draw
ADR providers back to socially defined "merits." It may be urged that, at least
in certain ADR contexts, like mediation, providers are trained to identify and
honor the parties' subjective views of the "merits." Whether mediators achieve
this objective is a fitting question for social science exploration. Professor
Guthrie marshals no evidence that mediators actually identify and pursue the
parties' subjective notions of the "merits," and, at least with respect to "evalua-
tive" mediators, admits that many do not realize this objective.6 7
In a number of different settings ADR processes have proven themselves
hostile to the poor, the weak, and the one-shot players.68 Courts, too, have
faced this sort of criticism. In response, the judicial branch of government has
adopted a range of procedures from discovery to legal aid. None of these has
worked perfectly, but all express a clear concern to control the excesses of the
powerful. A number of observers have remarked that ADR procedures, which
often do not have these procedural protections, are, generally, advantageous to
the strong. Richard Delgado and his colleagues so argued early in the ADR
debate. 69 A study of informal divorce processes in the Yale Law Journal
reached the same conclusion. 70 Similar difficulties have been identified in
court-annexed mediation.7 1
Though anecdotes prove little, one seems illustrative of the problem in the
court-connected ADR context. A California federal court employee-mediator
facing a potentially unbalanced and clearly difficult litigant convened a media-
tion session in an effort to resolve a thorny property case. He pressed the ses-
sion for fourteen hours without recess. At the end of that time the difficult
litigant was worn down and agreed to a "settlement" that surrendered her only
worldly assets and had the effect of putting her out on the street.72 That result
might have been legally defensible,73 but it raised the most serious questions
66 See Compulsion, supra note 41, at 1608-09.
67 Guthrie, supra note 5, at 454-55.
68 See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359 (1985); Gary LaFree & Christine
Rack, The Effects of Participants' Ethnicity and Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated
and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAW & Soc'y REV. 767, 789-93 (1996); Nancy A. Welsh,
Remembering the Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice
Theories, 54 J. LEGAL EDU. 49, 54 (2004).
69 See Delgado et al., supra note 68.
70 Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J.
1545, 1549.(1991).
71 See Compulsion, supra note 41, at 1619-22.
72 See Olam v. Cong. Mortgage Co., 68 F. Supp. 2d 1110 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
73 Id. at 1149.
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about mediator fairness and about the power wielded by ADR providers, often
at the behest of the well-heeled.
Professor Guthrie has given us a lot to think about. Our intellectual lives
are enriched by his work. Yet the old wisdom, won through centuries of expe-
rience, should not be forgotten because of the enchantment of new findings.
Judges are and always have been human. Most of us understand that and the
system has taken cognizance of it as well. Even in the days of Susanna and the
Elders more than two thousand years ago, it was understood that judges might
be corrupt.74 Since we seldom have, as in this story from the Apocrypha, a
hero like Daniel sent by the Lord to right the wrongs done by bad judges, we
have developed a number of mechanisms to help safeguard proceedings. They
include juries, open proceedings, clearly defined laws identifying the merits,
and appellate review. They do not work perfectly but they help significantly.
Moving away from them to secret, unregulated proceedings hardly seems the
most promising avenue for improvement.
7 See the Apocrypha story of Susanna and the Elders (Daniel 13). It recounts the travail of
a lovely young Hebrew woman who is falsely accused by two lecherous elders (judges). As
she bathes in her garden, having sent her attendants away, two lustful elders secretly spy on
the lovely Susanna. When she makes her way back to her house, they accost her, threatening
to claim that she has had a tryst with a young man in the garden unless she agrees to satisfy
their lustful desires. THE NEW OXFORD ANNOTATED BIBLE WITH THE APOCRYPHA 213
(Herbert G. May & Bruce M. Metzger eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1973). The incident is the
fulfillment of the Lord's prophecy when the two judges were appointed, "[i]niquity came
forth from Babylon, from the elders who were judges, who were supposed to govern the
people." Id.
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